The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area within China’s “Rule of Law”
Under Xi Jinping, “the rule of law” (fazhi, 法治) has become an increasingly important concept for understanding Chinese politics. Its scope is broad. Domestically, China’s rule-of-law agenda seeks to bring Party and state institutions, as well as markets and society, under legal norms, combat corruption, and establish orderly governance. At the same time, particular emphasis has recently been placed on “foreign-related rule of law” (shewai fazhi, 涉外法治), which concerns the legal governance of matters involving China’s external relations. This includes both the development of legal mechanisms to counter the extraterritorial application of domestic laws and economic sanctions by the United States and other countries, and efforts to strengthen China’s influence in the formation of international rules.
The development of the rule of law in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (Yue-Gang-Ao Dawanqu, 粤港澳大湾区), hereafter the Greater Bay Area, occupies an intermediate position between these two agendas. The Greater Bay Area lies within a single sovereign state, China. Yet it includes two Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and Macao, whose legal systems differ from that of mainland China. Any effort to develop the Greater Bay Area as an integrated economic region must therefore confront the question of how these different legal systems can be connected.
This is a matter of domestic governance. At the same time, it raises a question closely related to foreign-related rule of law: how can common rules be formed among different legal orders while allowing those orders to continue to coexist?
In September 2026, I visited Guangzhou in Guangdong Province, where I had the opportunity to exchange views with local researchers, legal professionals, and representatives of the Consulate-General of Japan. Drawing on insights gained during this visit, this article considers what the Greater Bay Area experiment reveals about China’s understanding and practice of “rule of law.”
“One Country, Two Systems, and Three Jurisdictions”
In February 2019, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council issued the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. The initiative seeks to develop nine mainland cities in Guangdong Province—including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai—together with the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions as an integrated economic region.
Building such an integrated economy, however, is far from easy. Constructing bridges and railways and connecting airports and ports are visible and relatively straightforward forms of infrastructural connectivity. More difficult questions arise as the cross-border movement of people, companies, goods, and information intensifies.
Will a professional qualification or license obtained in one jurisdiction be recognized in another? Can a medicine approved in Hong Kong be used in a hospital in Shenzhen? Can a judgment issued by a Hong Kong court be enforced in Guangdong Province? If a contractual or commercial dispute arises, which jurisdiction’s law should apply? Between 2019 and 2025, the people’s courts in Guangdong Province reportedly concluded 86,293 first-instance civil and commercial cases involving Hong Kong or Macao.
The Greater Bay Area is characterized by “one country, two systems, and three jurisdictions” (yiguo liangzhi, san fayu, 一国两制三法域). Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao belong to one state while maintaining different legal systems. Hong Kong has a common-law tradition, while Macao’s legal system retains the influence of Portuguese law. The differences extend beyond the judicial system to administrative regulation, professional qualifications, and the many rules governing business activity.
“Alignment of Rules” and “Coordination of Mechanisms”
Against this background, two concepts have gained particular prominence in the development of the Greater Bay Area: “alignment of rules” (guize xianjie, 规则衔接) and “coordination of mechanisms” (jizhi duijie, 机制对接).
The former refers to connecting or aligning the rules and standards of different jurisdictions. The latter concerns the mechanisms and procedures through which administrative bodies, courts, and other institutions operating under different systems can cooperate. Put simply, the first asks, “Which rules will the different jurisdictions recognize?” The second asks, “Who will put those rules into operation, and through what procedures?”
The resolution adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Twentieth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in July 2024 explicitly called for deeper cooperation within the Greater Bay Area and stronger alignment of rules and coordination of mechanisms.
How, then, are three different legal systems to be connected? What is particularly noteworthy is that China has not attempted to unify the three systems at a single stroke.
One example is the policy known as “Hong Kong and Macao Medicines and Medical Devices Connect” (Gang-Ao Yao-Xie Tong, 港澳药械通), which facilitates the use of pharmaceuticals and medical devices from Hong Kong and Macao. As a general rule, pharmaceuticals and medical devices that have not received national approval cannot be used in mainland China. In 2020, however, the central government created a pathway under which designated medical institutions in the nine mainland Greater Bay Area cities could, with the approval of the Guangdong provincial government, use urgently needed pharmaceuticals and medical devices already in clinical use in Hong Kong or Macao.
A similar approach has been taken toward professional qualifications. In the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin (Hengqin Yue-Ao Shendu Hezuoqu, 横琴粤澳深度合作区), architects, surveyors, and other professionals from Hong Kong and Macao may practice after filing the required documentation and meeting specified conditions, without having to obtain mainland qualifications anew. Similar arrangements have expanded to the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone (Qianhai Shen-Gang Xiandai Fuwuye Hezuoqu, 前海深港现代服务业合作区) and the Nansha Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Comprehensive Cooperation Demonstration Zone (Nansha Yue-Gang-Ao Quanmian Hezuo Shifanqu, 南沙粤港澳全面合作示范区). Following a pilot program authorized by the National People’s Congress, lawyers from Hong Kong and Macao have also been permitted to undertake a defined range of legal work in the nine mainland Greater Bay Area cities.
These are primarily examples of the alignment of rules. By conditionally recognizing approvals and professional qualifications issued in other jurisdictions, or by creating special pathways based on them, the authorities establish “passageways” through institutional barriers without formally unifying the legal systems themselves.
The coordination of mechanisms, by contrast, concerns the arrangements through which these rules are implemented in practice. In the judicial sphere, for example, the People’s Court of the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin and the Court of Final Appeal of the Macao Special Administrative Region have established a mechanism for directly entrusting each other with the service of judicial documents and the taking of evidence.
Previously, such requests had to be transmitted through higher-level courts. With authorization from the Supreme People’s Court, the intermediate stages can now be omitted, allowing the two courts to communicate directly. The Qianhai Cooperation Zone People’s Court and the Macao Court of Final Appeal have also introduced online mutual service of documents and evidence-taking.
In 2024, the High People’s Court of Guangdong Province launched a pilot program designating mediation bodies from Hong Kong and Macao as “specially invited mediation organizations” for the Greater Bay Area. Seven organizations, including the Hong Kong Mediation Council, and 120 mediators from Hong Kong and Macao were thereby incorporated into mechanisms for resolving cross-border disputes.
What characterizes such coordination of mechanisms, then, is not an attempt to make the different legal systems identical. Rather, it connects the institutions responsible for operating those systems and streamlines the procedures through which they interact.
Issue One: The Scope and Limits of Institutional Alignment
What questions do these efforts to align rules and coordinate mechanisms raise? The first concerns the scope and limits of institutional alignment.
The need to align rules and coordinate mechanisms does not mean that every rule can or should be connected in the same way. Local researchers distinguish among matters that are “easy to align,” those that “may be possible to align,” and those that “cannot be aligned” or are difficult to align.
At present, alignment has advanced most readily in areas such as civil and commercial affairs, professional qualifications, and administrative services. In these fields, it is relatively easy to identify shared interests in facilitating economic activity and regional development, making flexible arrangements more feasible.
Of particular interest is the use of “soft law.” Rather than immediately revising national laws and administrative regulations that are difficult to coordinate, industry associations, professionals, researchers, and other actors can develop common standards, industry norms, and guidelines within the scope of their authority. Instead of attempting to unify entire legal systems at once, the process begins with narrowly defined issues and gradually accumulates points of connection wherever coordination is feasible. Once conditions have matured, these arrangements can, where necessary, be transformed into more binding norms.
This suggests the possibility of bottom-up rule alignment, distinct from the top-down institutional development led by the state.
The same methods, however, are difficult to apply to criminal justice. The transfer or extradition of suspects, the collection of criminal evidence, investigations, seizures, and detention directly involve the exercise of state coercion and restrictions on individual liberty. As demonstrated by the controversy over the proposed amendments to Hong Kong’s extradition legislation in 2019, institutionally connecting Hong Kong and the mainland in this field carries implications fundamentally different from those involved in recognizing civil and commercial judgments.
Nevertheless, no perfectly clear boundary separates civil and commercial matters from criminal justice. Some intermediate areas require institutional connectivity to facilitate economic and social activity while also implicating individual rights and national security. Cross-border data flows are a typical example.
If a patient from Hong Kong receives medical treatment in Shenzhen, the patient’s medical information may need to be transferred back to Hong Kong. Similarly, when a university from Hong Kong or Macao conducts research at a campus in Guangdong Province, it may need to transfer research data to the relevant Special Administrative Region. Special channels for such data transfers have gradually been created in response to specific needs.
Data, however, are not merely an economic resource. Their movement raises questions of personal-information protection and national security. In mainland China in particular, a crucial issue is determining which information constitutes “important data” related to national security and should therefore be excluded from special cross-border transfer channels.
Efforts to align rules and coordinate mechanisms may begin with matters that are relatively easy to connect, such as the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and procedures. As their scope expands, however, they will increasingly reach fields involving individual rights, state coercion, and national security. The actors involved will repeatedly face difficult judgments over where to draw the line between matters that may be connected and those that cannot.
Issue Two: From the Greater Bay Area to Foreign-Related Rule of Law
At this point, it is useful to return to the significance of the Greater Bay Area’s structure of “one country, two systems, and three jurisdictions.” Differences among the legal systems clearly present obstacles to regional integration. Yet in the context of China’s foreign-related rule of law, they are not simply obstacles to be overcome.
Hong Kong’s common-law tradition, its long-standing experience with English-language legal practice, and its internationally respected expertise in arbitration and commercial dispute resolution can all serve as resources for China as it seeks to expand its influence in international rule-making.
Indeed, efforts to draw directly on or apply the laws of Hong Kong and Macao can already be found in multiple areas of rule alignment and mechanism coordination.
One example is the Greater Bay Area Platform for Legal Research and Ascertainment, coordinated by the High People’s Court of Guangdong Province and operated by the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court. The platform contains more than 30,000 laws and regulations from Hong Kong and Macao, together with over 400 cases in which those laws were ascertained and recognized in final judgments issued by mainland people’s courts. These materials are made available for reference in judicial practice.
In 2024, an arrangement for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments between mainland China and Hong Kong entered into force. In 2025, a further policy direction was announced under which certain enterprises established on the mainland side of the Greater Bay Area with investment from Hong Kong or Macao would be allowed to choose Hong Kong or Macao law as the governing law of their contracts and to select Hong Kong or Macao as the seat of arbitration.
Researching and, where necessary, applying the law of another jurisdiction; recognizing judgments issued by different courts; and allowing parties to choose the governing law and seat of arbitration are all mechanisms for managing disputes among different legal systems within the Greater Bay Area. At the same time, some of these mechanisms may also serve as techniques for resolving disputes in an international environment where different legal orders coexist.
The resolution adopted at the Third Plenum in 2024 discussed the alignment of rules and coordination of mechanisms in the Greater Bay Area in connection with “high-standard opening up” (gaoshuiping duiwai kaifang, 高水平对外开放). This strongly suggests that the Party leadership views the development of the rule of law in the Greater Bay Area as part of its wider strategy for foreign-related rule of law.
Given China’s size and the power of its central government, it is possible to assume that the legal systems of Hong Kong and Macao under “one country, two systems” will eventually converge with—or be compelled to converge with—the mainland system. It would be difficult to deny that such dynamics exist.
At the same time, however, Hong Kong’s continued maintenance of a legal system distinct from that of the mainland retains practical value for China’s pursuit of foreign-related rule of law, at least under present conditions.
The Greater Bay Area therefore appears to contain two competing vectors. One seeks to reduce legal and institutional differences among the three jurisdictions and integrate the region, particularly in the economic sphere. The other seeks to preserve those differences and use them as a resource connecting China to the international community.
How China balances these two forces in the Greater Bay Area may offer important evidence for understanding how it intends to manage its future relations with more diverse legal orders and seek a leading role in international rule-making.
Issue Three: “Top-Level Design” and Local Discretion
During my visit to Guangzhou, the question I found most compelling was who actually creates the new institutions produced through the alignment of rules and coordination of mechanisms. This is a question that reaches to the heart of Chinese politics.
Flexible coordination among different legal systems requires a certain degree of discretion at the operational level. New institutions cannot emerge through the mechanical application of existing laws alone. Chinese local governments, however, do not possess inherent autonomy comparable to that of states in a federal system.
Although local authorities enjoy certain legislative powers under China’s Legislation Law, those powers are clearly hierarchical. Local authorities cannot freely create institutions that conflict with superior laws. Central authorization therefore becomes essential when they seek to test new arrangements by modifying how existing laws are applied.
Yet even the authorization for reform provided for under the current Legislation Law does not always have clearly defined subjects or boundaries. The authority of social organizations and industry associations expected to develop soft law is even more limited.
Under Xi Jinping, increasing emphasis has been placed on the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and on “top-level design” (dingceng sheji, 顶层设计)—a system in which the Party leadership, with General Secretary Xi Jinping at its apex, oversees the entire policy process from design to implementation. Under these conditions, the discretionary space available to local governments and social organizations for independent institutional development appears to be narrowing further.
In practice, local governments must continually obtain central approval when advancing the alignment of rules and coordination of mechanisms. The policy facilitating the use of pharmaceuticals and medical devices from Hong Kong and Macao, for example, did not result from Guangdong Province unilaterally changing national pharmaceutical regulations. It became possible only because the central government delegated authority to Guangdong for specified matters in designated areas. Similarly, the system allowing lawyers from Hong Kong and Macao to practice in the nine mainland Greater Bay Area cities was piloted only after receiving special authorization from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Requiring central approval for every individual measure, however, is inefficient. Consider the process of approving, distributing, and ultimately using a pharmaceutical product in medical practice. It involves multiple government bodies, including the National Medical Products Administration, the National Health Commission, the National Healthcare Security Administration, and the Ministry of Commerce. Coordinating the views and interests of all these agencies is far from straightforward.
Moreover, the responsible departments within higher-level institutions are not necessarily familiar with conditions on the ground. Senior officials also differ in their enthusiasm for and interest in the Greater Bay Area initiative and the connection of its legal systems. Policies that had been advancing may sometimes be forced to stop following personnel changes.
Local officials responsible for aligning rules and coordinating mechanisms in the Greater Bay Area must therefore carry out their work within a chain of decision-making filled with uncertainty. This situation embodies a fundamental paradox between an ambitious reform agenda and the centralization of policy-making authority.
What the Greater Bay Area Reveals about China’s “Rule of Law”
Examining the development of the rule of law in the Greater Bay Area through both documentary research and local interviews brought two characteristics into renewed focus: the long-term strategic orientation of the Chinese state and the complexity of the legal, interpersonal, and interest-based relationships encountered when translating that strategy into actual institutions.
From outside China, what first attracts attention are large-scale national strategies such as the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, foreign-related rule of law, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The Party Central Committee sets long-term objectives, and the entire country appears to move in a single direction.
Yet these vast policies are transformed into concrete institutions by individual officials, judges, lawyers, and specialists. They must interpret the central authorities’ policy direction, determine the boundaries of their own authority, and negotiate and coordinate with the relevant government departments. Meanwhile, central policies may change, personnel in the agencies involved may be replaced, and economic and fiscal conditions may shift. No single actor can fully control the process as a whole.
During my conversations with both Japanese and Chinese participants in Guangzhou, I was struck by how often I heard local government officials in contemporary China described as “working desperately hard.”
The anti-corruption campaign and the tightening of discipline have made the environment surrounding government employees increasingly severe. Slower economic growth and deteriorating local finances have added further pressure. Even so, those who have entered government institutions after surviving intense competition continue to work strenuously to translate the central leadership’s long-term objectives into concrete policies.
It is, of course, easy to point out that China’s political system contains problems such as rigidity, institutional timidity, and waste. Yet if we overlook the institutional innovations steadily emerging even under these conditions, we risk failing to grasp how the system actually operates.
Grand “top-level designs” and frontline experimentation under limited authority are connected by various institutional devices: authorization, pilot programs (shidian, 试点), mutual recognition, filing and registration procedures, and soft law developed by industry associations and other organizations. New rules gradually emerge through the friction, experimentation, and repeated adjustment generated within these arrangements.
The experience accumulated through this process will not necessarily remain confined to the Greater Bay Area. It may also provide a foundation for China to exert greater influence in the formation of international rules.
In this sense, the Greater Bay Area reveals both the possibilities of the particular form of “rule of law” that China is attempting to construct in the Xi Jinping era and the tensions inherent within it.
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